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PRIVATISATION AND INDIGENOUS OWNERSHIP:  
EVIDENCE FROM AFRICA 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, privatisation has become commonplace across Africa. According 
to World Bank (2001: 259) data, by the end of 1999 3,529 privatisation transactions had 
occurred across Africa with a total value of nearly US $8 billion, and, while some 
governments are more active than others, in only ten of the fifty-three African countries had 
no privatisation activity been recorded. The doubts prevalent in the early and mid-1990s, that 
African governments would deliver on their commitments to privatise enterprises have 
receded, and attention has increasingly focused on the terms on which enterprises have 
entered the private sector. 
 
The pursuit of privatisation has generally been interpreted as entailing the abandonment of 
existing development objectives by both proponents and opponents alike. In post colonial 
Africa, state enterprise were one of the main instruments through which development policy 
was implemented (Tangri 1999). They provided governments with a very direct means 
through which they could intervene and were often chosen to fulfil a range of duties such as 
establishing new industries, providing employment and controlling the prices of basic 
consumer goods. Critics argued that these practices over-burdened state enterprises and 
ultimately undermined their financial and commercial viability (Nellis and Kikeri 1989). 
Privatisation was advocated as a means to free these enterprises from state control, allowing 
them to drop their costly non-commercial objectives and to respond instead to market signals 
(Boycko et al 1996). Opponents of privatisation shared many of these expectations, and 
feared that the sale of state enterprises would entail redundancies, rising prices and the loss of 
national control of the economy (Pitcher 1996; Harsch 2000). 
 
An alternative approach to privatisation is presented by Manzetti (1993), who argued that the 
adoption of privatisation could represent, a change in the means rather than the ends of 
development policy.1 If state enterprises had been established to promote certain objectives, 
but consistently failed to achieve them, privatisation should not be interpreted as a 
abandonment of these goals, but of a discredited means to achieve them. Manzetti’s analysis 
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raises a number of interesting research questions. Are the objectives of privatisation those 
which were previously pursued through state enterprises, or has there been a narrowing or 
reconfiguration of these, and what scope is there for privatisation to deliver these objectives? 
  
This paper focuses more narrowly on the potential for the government to use privatisation as 
a means to promote indigenisation. Indigenisation refers to the transfer of economic power to 
the local population and has been common throughout Africa in the post colonial period. It 
was promoted through a range of initiatives, including measures that excluded foreign owned 
enterprises from certain economic sectors, provided new sources of finance to local 
businesses, and gave preferential treatment to local businesses in public tendering. These 
initiatives did not always prove to be wholly successful and were subject to a range of 
constraints (Adedeji, 1981: Himbara 1994). Nevertheless, the aspiration to promote 
indigenisation continues to be widely held in the era of liberalisation and privatisation and 
while it is sometimes articulated through objectives such as ‘broadening ownership’ or 
‘ensuring distributional equity’, it has also been more forthrightly expressed in the rejection 
of ‘re-colonisation’ through privatisation (Bell 1995; Etukudo 1997). 
 
Section One provides a discussion of privatisation and presents a typology of the measures 
that can be used to promote indigenisation. In Section Two, some of these methods are 
examined in the context of the Zambian privatisation programme. This is an ambitious 
programme that has succeeded in privatising the majority of state enterprises and has been 
hailed as one of the most successful in Africa (Campbell White and Bhatia 1998). The 
success and failures of the Zambian programme are examined, before the paper moves on to 
the concluding Section Three, which places the Zambian experience in a comparative 
context.  
 
PRIVATISATION AND INDIGENISATION 
The term privatisation has, and continues to be, subject to a number of competing definitions. 
At its broadest it has been conceived as constituting measures that are aimed to strengthen the 
private sector of the economy. In this paper ‘privatisation’ is defined more narrowly as any 
measure by which the ownership of a state enterprise is relinquished by the state. Thus it 
covers outright sales of state enterprises as going-concerns or sales of controlling 
shareholdings in such companies, as well as measures such as the closure and liquidation of 
enterprises. The definition does not, however, include a range of other actions such as leasing 
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or the granting of management contracts, which affect the operational control rather than the 
ownership of the assets.  
 
 It is important to recognise that even within the restricted definition of privatisation that is 
adopted here, that there are a range of different methods through which enterprises may be 
sold2. In the case of a company wholly owned by the government, the whole interest could be 
sold privately to a single purchaser or consortium. On the other hand, the shares of the 
company could be sold through a public offering which would be likely to involve a broader 
range of smaller investors. The government might also consider if it wishes to privatise the 
company in its current corporate form, or alternatively, whether it would be preferable to 
unbundle or split-up the company up into a number of constituent units which could be sold 
separately. In addition to this, the government may undertake a range of measures to affect 
the environment in which such sales take place, for example the promotion of financial 
institutions such as stock exchanges and the creation of competition policy. 
 
To analyse the ways in which these modalities can be used to address indigenisation, a 
distinction can be drawn between measures which we can label facilitative, prescriptive and 
empowering. Each will be reviewed in turn. 
 
• Facilitative. These measures relate to the form in which the enterprise is offered for sale. 
For example the decision to unbundle a single large company into a number of smaller 
enterprises may allow potential purchasers with more limited resources to seek its 
acquisition. A similar situation is apparent in the case of the public sale of shares as 
opposed to the private sale of the entire enterprise. While the resources to purchase the 
whole enterprise may be beyond the capacity of most citizens, the opportunity to buy a 
small shareholding will be open to far more. 
• Prescriptive. These measures relate to those who are which either specifically include or 
exclude certain groups from participating in the privatisation programme. An example of 
such as measure might be the decision of a government selling an enterprise to give first 
refusal to the management or the employees of that enterprise and only if they chose not 
to proceed with its acquisition would it then be offered to others. Another measure which 
could be included within this group would be directed group ownership, in which a group 
of stakeholders is invited to purchase the enterprise. An example of this is the sale of four 
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Ugandan tea factories which the government chose to sell to the tea growers who supplied 
them. 
• Empowering. These measures are designed to assist local investors to participate in the 
privatisation opportunities which are available by ensuring that they have adequate 
financial capacity. Often these will overlap with other measures which are designed to 
support and encourage the expansion of local enterprise, such as the establishment of 
development finance institutions and the creation of local capital markets. Other measures 
that are specifically related to the privatisation process might include special financial 
facilities for indigenous investors to make payments by instalments rather than in a lump 
sum. 
 
Despite the differences between each of these approaches, they each seek to overcome the 
perceived weakness of the local investors, either by making assets or shareholdings available 
in small units which are more likely to be within their financial and managerial reach; by 
shielding them from competition with foreign capital which may have greater capacity; or by 
extending particular assistance to them to compensate for these shortcomings. As might be 
expected, it has been common to combine a number of these approaches in practice. 
However, each type of measure can be seen to address these common problems from a 
different angle, and differentiation between them can be useful for the analysis of their single 
and combined effectiveness. 
 
THE ZAMBIAN EXPERIENCE 
Privatisation first appeared on the Zambian government’s policy agenda in 1990 during the 
Presidency of Kenneth Kaunda. However, it was not until a change of regime in late 1991, 
that progress towards implementation really got underway. Unlike its predecessor, the new 
government of President Frederick Chiluba was strongly committed to implementing a 
programme of neo-liberal economic reform of which privatisation was a key component. A 
new and more comprehensive privatisation programme was launched in 1992, which has 
resulted in the transfer of the majority of state enterprises into private ownership. As shown 
in Table 1, by the end of August 2001, 119 enterprises out of the original portfolio of 144 had 
been privatised.3 Although progress has been most substantial among small and medium 
sized enterprises, it has not been restricted to these categories, and over 70 percent of large 
enterprises have also been privatised. 
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Table 1. The Extent of Privatisation in Zambia (1992 to August 2001) 
Size of State 
Enterprise 
Number of 
Enterprises in 
Original Portfolio 
Number of 
Enterprises 
Privatised 
Number of 
Remaining State 
Enterprises 
Size Unclassified 9 1 8 
Large Enterprise 27 19 8 
Medium 
Enterprise 
27 25 2 
Small Enterprise 81 74 7 
Total.  144 119 25 
Source: Compiled from ZPA (various), Times of Zambia (various), The Post (various), and Reuters (various). 
 
The only exception to this pattern of privatisation is among enterprises unclassified by size, a 
category which consisted of strategic and utility enterprise. The only enterprise within this 
category that has been privatised is the state copper mining enterprise, Zambia Consolidated 
Copper Mines (ZCCM) (Craig 2001). However, the significance of this level of progress 
should not be underestimated. ZCCM was an enterprise of great economic as well as 
symbolic importance, accounting for around ten percent of gross domestic product and three 
quarters of all foreign exchange earnings. It can be concluded, therefore, that while some 
enterprises remain within state ownership the overall level of privatisation has been 
substantial and has affected the core sectors of the economy. 
 
To provide for the implementation of the programme, legislation was passed in 1992 to create 
the Zambian Privatisation Agency (ZPA) which was given a wide range of duties covering 
both the design and the implementation of the policy.4 This legislation has attracted 
international attention, and has been praised for creating the ZPA as an independent agency 
with extensive powers to execute sales (Campbell White and Bhatia 1998). While there is 
much truth in this characterisation, it should also be recognised that the governance of the 
ZPA has been the subject of local criticism and that the agency did require government 
ratification for its actions in a number of key areas (Craig 2000). 
 
In the context of indigenisation, the framework established for the privatisation programme 
may be analysed under the headings of facilitative, prescriptive and empowering measures 
introduced earlier.  
 7
 
• Facilitative. The legislation allowed the ZPA great flexibility in designing the method 
through which enterprises would be privatised. While outlining a range of possible 
methods, the legislation permitted the ZPA to employ any method that it considered 
appropriate. In addition, the agency was given the authority to restructure enterprises 
before sale, which allowed it to unbundle larger companies into constituent units. 
Therefore, the legislation provided significant scope for the methods of sale to be adopted 
which suited indigenous investors. 
• Prescriptive. Although no general restrictions were placed on the participation of foreign 
investors in the programme, the Act included a number of provisions which could be 
utilised for this purpose. Firstly, it specified that bids should be evaluated not only on the 
basis of the price that was offered, but also with reference to the characteristics of the 
bidder, including their nationality. While this was only one of a number of factors that 
had to be considered by the ZPA, it nevertheless provided scope for a degree of 
preference to be given to local bidders. Secondly, the flexibility in method of sale also 
allowed some scope for prescription through the adoption of methods such as 
management and employee buy-outs and directed group ownership. Finally, the Act 
provided for the establishment of a Privatisation Trust Fund. The fund was to act as a 
warehouse for shares in newly privatised enterprises, which would be sold-on to Zambian 
citizens.5 
• Empowering. The Act also made provision for Zambian citizens to receive preferential 
treatment in the privatisation process through a number of mechanisms. Small batches of 
shares could be made available to Zambian citizens at a discount, with further bonus 
shares issued to those who retained them for the longer term. While these arrangements 
were focused on public sales, a further concession allowed citizens to make payments for 
either packages of shares or whole enterprises by instalments, rather than making the full 
payment at the time of sale.  
 
Assessing the commitment of a number of African countries to broadening ownership 
through privatisation, Campbell White and Bhatia (1998:113) rated the commitment of the 
Zambian government as ‘high’. However, indigenisation was not by any means the only, or 
even primary aim of the Zambian programme. Like other countries in the region, it also 
pursued privatisation to improve public finances, promote competition and market efficiency, 
 8
encourage new foreign investment and to demonstrate to donors a commitment to reform. 
Foreign investors, for example, were encouraged participate in the privatisation programme 
through access to the beneficial terms offered though Zambia’s investment legislation, the 
provisions of which were subsequently made more attractive (Ngenda 1994). 
 
Overall, the privatisation programme does appear to have achieved some success in 
promoting indigenisation, with seventy per cent of sales reported to have been to Zambian 
citizens (Business Day 9/6/1999). However, these sales appear to have been concentrated 
among the smaller enterprises and unbundled units of larger companies. In only one case was 
a large or medium enterprise privatised intact acquired by Zambian investors. However, any 
attempt to assemble comprehensive data on who purchased which assets during the course of 
the privatisation programme confronts a number of problems. While the fate of the larger 
enterprises can generally be tracked through a variety of sources, that of smaller enterprises, 
unbundled units and the assets of liquidated companies can be more difficult to follow. In 
addition, the identity of the purchaser may not always be easy to discern, a point that has 
been raised locally in connection with a number of transactions.6 An alternative approach is 
to begin with an examination of the method of sale adopted for each enterprise. Such an 
analysis provides a useful overview of the extent to which measures to promote 
indigenisation have been pursued and allows for the exploration of the role of facilitative, 
prescriptive and empowering measures of indigenisation. 
 
Table 2 categorises the enterprises that have been privatised according to the method through 
which this has been achieved. Overall, most enterprises were privatised intact as going 
concerns, and in most cases this was achieved through a private sale. The balance between 
different methods of sale varies considerably between the different categories of enterprise. 
For example, among enterprises classified as large or medium sized, unbundling has been as 
least as common as the privatisation of enterprises in their pre-existing form.  
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Table 2. Privatisation by Method (1992 to August 2001) 
Method of 
Privatisation 
Size 
Unclassified 
Large 
enterprises 
Medium 
enterprises 
Small 
enterprises 
Total. 
Privatised Intact 
Of which: 
- 7 10 54 71 
Public Sale - - - - - 
Private Sale - 7 10 42 59 
Designated 
MBO 
- - - 6 6 
Returned to 
Previous 
owner. 
- - - 6 6 
      
Unbundled 1 7 10 3 21 
      
Liquidated - 5 5 17 27 
      
Total.  1 19 25 74 119 
Source: Compiled from ZPA (various), Times of Zambia (various), The Post (various), and Reuters (various). 
Note: Classification reflect the judgements of the author and not necessarily the 
classifications of the ZPA. Although unbundling is not in itself a form of divestiture, the 
difficulties involved in tracing the resulting assets have led to its treatment as such in this 
section. 
 
Particularly striking is the absence of any instances of the public sale of the majority 
shareholding in any enterprise. In the early stages of the programme it was expected that 
around ten enterprises would be sold though this method. There are a number of reasons why 
this target has not as yet been achieved, but perhaps one of the most significant has been 
where an existing minority shareholder has held pre-emptive rights to any shares sold by the 
government. Typical, these situations arose where the state enterprise was either established 
as a joint venture between the Zambian state and a foreign enterprise, or was the legacy of 
Zambia’s fifty-one percent nationalisation formula from the late 1960s.7 However, during the 
privatisation programme of the 1990s, these rights constituted a material constraint as the 
ZPA had to reach agreement with the minority shareholders over the terms of the 
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privatisations. In these circumstance, the ZPA commonly sought to negotiate an agreement in 
which provision was made for a minority interest in the enterprise to be sold through a public 
sale to Zambian citizens and financial institutions.  
 
Chilanga Cement, was the first large-scale enterprise to be divested in the Zambian 
programme. The enterprise had, effectively, a monopoly position. It was the only cement 
producer in Zambia and was protected from external competition by the high transportation 
costs. Chilanga Cement also had a good record of profitability and met many of the criteria 
outlined by the ZPA for an enterprise which could be privatised through a public sale. 
However, Chilanga was not wholly owned by the Zambian government. While they held 
nearly sixty percent of the shares, significant minority interests were held by CDC and Anglo 
American. An existing agreement between the shareholders, however, provided for CDC and 
Anglo American to exercise pre-emptive rights over the sale of any of the equity held by the 
Zambian state. When Chilanga Cement was announced as a candidate for privatisation, CDC 
in consultation with Anglo American, chose to exercise those rights and entered into 
negotiations with the ZPA to acquire a majority holding. In October 1994 agreement was 
reached which gave a controlling interest in the company to CDC, but also transferred 27.4% 
of the equity to the Privatisation Trust Fund, to be offered for sale to Zambian citizens and 
financial institutions. The flotation of the company on the Lusaka Stock Exchange was 
successfully completed in May 1995. 
 
The ‘Chilanga model’ of a private sale of the majority of a controlling interest to existing 
shareholders with pre-emptive rights with provision for a public sale of a minority 
shareholding, proved to be a popular formula. Overall, such arrangements were the basis for 
the privatisation agreements for five of the seven large enterprises and four of the ten medium 
enterprises that were sold intact. However, the completion of these arrangements has 
encountered a number of problems. Following the successful sale of shares in Chilanga 
Cement, the programme of sales was suspended late 1995 after an offer of shares in 
Rothmans was undersubscribed. The process resumed with the successful offer of shares in 
Zambia Sugar in 1996 and the even more popular flotation of shares Zambia Breweries in 
June 1997. However, the low demand for National Breweries shares in March 1998 brought a 
renewed suspension to the programme.8 
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Underlying this stop-go approach are a range of factors. For example, the Zambian Securities 
and Exchange Commission among others complained that the minimum number of shares for 
which application could be made has been set at too high a level for many Zambians to 
participate, a problem which has been aggravated by the absence of collective investment 
vehicles such as unit trusts (The Post, 15/8/1996; 5/11/1997). These served not only to 
exclude a number of potential investors, but also to restrict the pool of savings that the sale 
could tap into. However, even with such arrangements in place, the potential for participation 
is limited by the high levels of poverty in Zambia. As the Zambian Government (2001: 19) 
noted, increased levels of poverty and unemployment has left few households with the 
surplus income for investment. 
 
In addition, there are also underlying limitations in the ‘Chilanga model’ as a method of 
indigenisation. While it does offer a valuable personal investment opportunity for those who 
can acquire the shares, it provides little basis for the acquisition of indigenous control of the 
company. If the trading price of the shares rises, then of those who have bought shares may 
be tempted to sell them for a quick profit, and if wider prescriptive ownership restrictions are 
not in place, this may result in the acquisition of the shares by foreign portfolio investors. 
Indeed, in cases where companies are taken over, the regulations of the Lusaka Stock 
Exchange require that the offer is extended to all shareholders, opening the possibility that 
the level of indigenous ownership might decline still further. Indeed, the potential for such 
scenarios has emerged in recent years, with terms for the takeovers of Chilanga Cement, 
National Breweries and Zambia Sugar (Times of Zambia, 1/3/2001). 
 
As noted earlier, unbundling also featured prominently in the Zambian privatisation 
programme and provided a potential method through which indigenous acquisitions could be 
facilitated. However, the ZPA faced a number of constraints in the application of this method. 
Firstly, the degree to which the unbundling of an enterprise could be achieved depended 
partly upon its degree of internal integration. Generally, this had limited unbundling to 
companies that were horizontally diversified, in sectors such as hotelling, farming and 
trading. The rights of existing minority shareholders have also proved to be a constraint on  
the ZPA. In the milling sector, for example, it was planned to unbundle the four state milling 
companies into fifteen separate enterprises. This was achieved in all but one case, where the 
minority shareholder opposed the scheme and the company was privatised intact. 
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One potential problem with unbundling is that the Government may secure buyers for the 
most profitable assets, but be left with those which are less attractive. In the case of the large 
enterprise, Zambia Breweries, the minority shareholder, Anglo American, accepted ZPA 
proposals to split the company in two, with the Lusaka Brewery retaining the name Zambia 
Breweries and the leading product brand names, while the Ndola brewery took the name 
Northern Breweries. While the new Zambian Breweries was sold to Anglo American and 
South African Breweries in 1994, it was a further two years before a buyer could be found for 
Northern Breweries. Subsequently, Northern Breweries experienced difficulties in 
maintaining commercial viability, and was finally sold to Zambia Breweries in 1999 to 
prevent its closure (The Post, 2/2/1999).  
 
While the discussion has so far concentrated on facilitative measures, some prescriptive 
measures were also employed in the privatisation programme. As outlined in Table 2, six 
enterprises were privatised through prescribed management or employee buy-outs. This 
related to an initiative launched in 1994, in which the ZPA took the initiative in offering a 
number of enterprises directly to their management. These consisted of a mixture of small 
enterprises and unbundled units of larger companies and some of them had previously been 
unsuccessfully offered for competitive sale. The success of the initiative was limited, and of 
the fourteen small sized enterprises offered, only six were finally sold to their management. 
At the time of the initiative a number of objections had been raised and it was not 
subsequently repeated. However, these sales were not the only management buy-outs that 
were completed during the course of the privatisation programme, and a number of other 
agreements have been completed through competitive private sale. 
 
Attention has frequently been drawn to the failure of the Zambian financial sector to 
adequately cater for the medium and longer term financial requirements of local business. 
This situation has been aggravated during the privatisation period, with the pursuit of a 
tighter monetary policy and the scaling down of the activities of state owned financial 
institutions, such as the Development Bank of Zambia. In addition, despite the efforts of the 
Zambian Securities and Exchange Commission, the Lusaka Stock Exchange has played only 
a minor role in raising finance for local companies and is dominated by former state 
enterprises.9 Such difficulties have adversely affected the ability of Zambian entrepreneurs to 
participate, particularly in the difficult conditions of the structural adjustment. 
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These problems point to what has perhaps been an imbalance in the Zambian attempts to 
promote indigenisation through the privatisation process. While a range of facilitative 
methods have been pursued, there has been, and remains, inadequate support from 
empowering measures to enable a greater participation of indigenous investors in the 
programme. However, this has not been the only constraint. The existence of pre-emptive 
rights has reduced the opportunities available for the government and the ZPA to pursue 
facilitative and prescriptive measures, alongside other factors such as the difficult economic 
conditions of structural adjustment. 
 
COMPARATIVE REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Many of the issues that have been examined in the context of Zambia’s privatisation 
programme are reflected in the experiences of countries across Africa. Although the 
categories adopted do not match those employed in this paper, a broad comparative picture of 
the methods of privatisation that have been used, can be discerned from data compiled by the 
World Bank (2001: 260). This shows that the most common forms of privatisation has been 
the private sales of enterprises, and that this has usually been conducted through a 
competitive sales process. The liquidation of state enterprises has also been widespread, 
while cases involving the public sale of shares (including minority flotations) have been less 
common.  
 
No indication is given of the relative sizes of enterprises which have been privatised through 
each method or the characteristics of those who have bought them. However, some indication 
of these patterns are provided by other sources. Reviewing the experience of privatisation 
across Africa, Harsch (2000) suggests that while most privatisation may have involved local 
investors, these have tended to be skewed towards smaller enterprises, with foreign investors 
dominating the purchases of larger enterprises.10 Such a picture provides a fairly accurate 
account of the pattern of sales in Zambia and also appears to be supported by evidence from 
other cases. Pitcher (1996:55) reports a similar pattern in Mozambique, as does Stjernfalt 
(2000: 21) for Ghana, Tukahebwa (1998) for Uganda and Gibbon (1999) for Tanzania. 
 
A variety of factors have contributed to the emergence of these patterns. While in Kenya and 
Ghana, the problem of pre-emptive rights held by foreign minority shareholders has been a 
particularly significant factor, more generally the weakness of the indigenous private sector 
has limited its ability to acquire enterprises. For example, both Bennell (1997: 1797) and 
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Makonnen (1999:7) refer to cases in which indigenous investors have defaulted on payments 
when purchasing enterprises by instalments. Indeed, the frequency of such situations led the 
Ugandan Privatisation Agency, in 1995, to give preference to bidders offering a single 
payment, with detrimental implications for broadening access to ownership. In other cases, 
the local investors have successfully purchased enterprises but subsequently run into 
problems related to insufficient levels of working capital. 
 
Such instances point to the need to embed privatisation programmes within broader initiatives 
which nurture the development of local private enterprise, if indigenisation is to succeed. 
Indeed research from other regions suggests that privatisation is most likely to be successful 
in promoting developmental objectives when it is integrated into a broader policy framework 
which support these goals (Shin, 1990; Rodinelli and Iacono, 1996). However, as 
Mkandawire (1994) and Moshi (1997: 167) have argued, such possibilities have been limited 
in many African cases where privatisation has been implemented in pursuit of structural 
adjustment programmes agreed with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In 
this context, the World Bank, itself an advocate of broadening ownership, has been 
particularly keen to encourage the involvement of foreign investors in privatisation 
transactions (Cook and Kirkpatrick 1995: 15). Such constraints have, therefore, limited scope 
for measures aimed to promote indigenisation, which must be balanced against a range of 
other competing objectives.  
 
It is important to recognise, however, that privatisation transactions which successfully 
transfer enterprises to local ownership, can encounter problems of their own. Indeed, as in the 
case of the sale of an enterprise to a foreign buyer, the sale of an enterprise to a local 
investors can create controversy over the identity of the buyer. At the heart of this problem is 
the highly politicised process of the development of a business class in many African 
countries (Tangri 1999). Reflecting the historic underdevelopment of this class, the success of 
its members is often highly dependent on political support and sponsorship. In the case of 
Uganda, Tangri and Mwenda (2001) detail how a number of privatisations were used to 
transfer assets to senior political figures and their families on particularly beneficial terms, 
and similar concerns have been raised in Zambia (Craig, 2000), Burkina Faso (Sawadogo, 
2000) and Cote d’Ivoire (Wilson, 1994). In such circumstances, Tangri and Mwenda (2001: 
132-33) argue that “privatization has promoted the creation of a tiny wealthy class, rather 
than, as was its expressed objective, ‘broadening the basis of ownership’ among the African 
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population”. While such cases are a cause for concern, it might be suggested that even if 
these assets had been transferred with the utmost transparency, that this would still have 
tended to benefit a minority of the population. As Ayiyo and Jerome (1999: 210) observe, the 
high levels of poverty in much of Africa severely limits the number of households able to 
participate in such  initiatives.  
 
However, such structural problems should not lead us to under-estimate the degree to which 
privatisation has provided opportunities for indigenisation. It has been suggested in this paper 
that these opportunities can be maximised through initiatives that include a combination of 
facilitative, prescriptive and empowering measures, which are implemented within a policy 
context that is supportive of local business development. Indeed, as Africa moves through the 
process of privatisation new opportunities for indigenisation are likely to emerge. Returning 
to the Zambian experience, the case of the takeover of National Breweries by Zambia 
Breweries in 1999 provides an interesting example of this. Although indigenous investors 
were only directly involved as minority shareholders in each of these privatised enterprises, 
the Zambian Competition Commission required that 4 of National Breweries 10 brewery 
plants should be sold to local entrepreneurs (Times of Zambia 30/4/1999). While on the one 
hand this was intended to guard against the monopolisation of the sector, it also provided a 
new avenue for indigenisation. In this respect it is important to recognise the process of 
indigenisation is unlikely to end with the completion of the privatisation process and that 
there is much which can still be achieved through the active regulation of the post-
privatisation environment. 
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Notes 
                                                           
1 While presented as a framework for developing countries in general, Manzetti’s analysis was 
illustrated by a case study of Argentina. For an attempt to employ it within an African context, see 
Siddiqui (1997). 
2 One of the best accounts of the different methods through which privatisation can be implemented 
continues to be Vuylsteke (1988). On methods which are particularly directed towards broadening 
ownership or indigenisation, see Bell (1995), Campbell White and Bhatia (1998, 34-41) and 
Makonnen (1999). 
3 The ZPA itself measures progress against the privatisation transactions that it has completed. 
However, such an approach tends to inflate the number of reported privatisations by counting multiple 
sales when a single company is unbundled. An alternative approach, adopted here, is to evaluate the 
extent of divestment by reference to the original portfolio of enterprises compiled by the ZPA. This 
avoids the problem of double counting and provides some measure of the extent to which assets 
remain in state ownership. By the end of August 2001 the ZPA had recorded 251 privatisation 
transactions. 
4 A useful summary of the Act is provided by Ngenda (1993), while Fundanga and Mwaba (1997) 
provide a good review of the main features of the programme. 
5 Munshi (1995) provides a good review of the arrangements for the Zambia Privatisation Trust Fund. 
6 See for example Institutional Investor (31 December 1998) and reports concerning the privatisation 
of Ndola Lime (Post 28/8/1998; and Africa Analysis 1/5/01) 
7 In addition to the cases of pre-emptive rights, six small enterprises that were nationalised during the 
1980s were ordered by the courts to be returned to their previous owners. 
8 Flotations remained suspended until the offer of Pamodzi Hotels in November/December 2001. 
9 SEC (Annual Report, 1997). Privatised companies account for 6 out of the 9 companies listed on the 
Zambian Stock Exchange, and only one company has used the market to raise new capital.  
10 When indigenous investors have participated in the privatisation of larger enterprises, this has 
usually been through the public flotations of minority interests. 
